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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN F. HARDING, 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
MARY ALLEN, 
Defendant and Respondent 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
I. 
THE APPEAL 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District 
Court of Weber County, Utah, Judge John F. Wahl-
quist, presiding, tried without a jury. The parties will 
be referred to as in the court helow. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves a boundary line dispute. Glen 
F. Harding, the owner of some real property on the 
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Northeast corner of 23rd Street and Ogden A venue, 
in Ogden, Utah, and whose north line adjoins the south 
line of certain real property owned by Mary .Allen 
brought this suit to quiet title to his property as de-
scribed in his deeds. Plaintiff had purchased his prop-
erty in two parcels. The first parcel, the west 66 feet 
of his property, was purchased from l\iary Weller, 
April 7, 1951 (Ex. A, Page 85), and the second parcel, 
the east 49.5 feet, was purchased from Joseph H. 
Hunter, June 30, 1951 (Ex. B., Page 47). 
Defendant Mary Allen purchased her property, 
which fronts on Ogden Ave.nue, on D'ecember 11, 1937, 
and has occupied the property constantly since that time. 
(Tr. 39). 
Divid1ng plaintiff and defendant's properties, a 
wood fence begins on the east corner of the true common 
boundary line, and runs thence some 83 feet westerly, 
on a bias to the south; this fence terminates 1.9 feet 
south (and on plaintiff's side· of).~.the true boundary 
line, and 30 feet short of the western end of the proper-
ties. (Ex. C). 
At the time defendant originally purchased her 
property, there was a fence existing along the same 
line as the present f1ence, and extending beyond the west 
end of the present fence about 4 to 6 feet to a tree. 
No evidence was given as to the origin of this fence. 
About 1 Y2 years after defendant acquired the property 
this tree was lmocked down by a truck, and the west 
terminus of the renee reverted to somewhere near its 
present location (Tr. 81, 86). 
During this tin1e, the west section of plaintiff's 
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proJ><:'rty (the Weller property) was occupied by a 
house and garage. The east section (the Hunter prop-
Prty) was unoccupied (Tr. 59). A double driveway 
from Ogden Avenue serviced the defendant's property 
and the W eUer property. The evidence was in conflict 
as to whether this was divided, or was one large drive-
way used for both properties. However, two of de-
fendant's witnesses indicated it to be one large drive-
way. (Tr. 37, 65, Ex. 3). 
This situation existed without interruption until 
1946 or 1947, when Mr. Hunter, the owner of the east 
section, informed defendant he had th'e property sur-
veyed, and that defendant's fence was on Hunter's prop-
erty. To this defendant replied that when the f'ence 
was replaced it would be corrected (Tr. 90). Sometime 
thereafter, defendant and her sons replaced the fence 
\Vith the present one. In doing so, they placed it on 
the smne line as the earlier fence. Nothing further 
transpired between defendant and Hunter regarding 
the boundary and the Hunter tract remain1ed vacant. 
When plaintiff purchased his property, this recon-
structed fence was perhaps 8 feet short of the tree that 
n1arks its present terminus. Plaintiff testified there 
was nothing in this 8 foot space, and defendant testified 
that son1e wire was strung from the end of the fence 
to the tree (Tr. 9, 62). This vacant area was then filled 
by a section of picket from defendant's rear fence. 
When plaintiff acquired the property in 1951, no 
survey had been made. Plaintiff removed the house on 
the Weller section and began construction of his com-
mercial structure. In 1953 or 1954, plaintiff erected the 
garage on his property and added the fence shown in 
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defendant's Exhibits 1-7. This fence ran easterly from 
the Ogden A venue sidewalk to the west end of defend-
ant's fence, and was in place from 6 months to a year 
or better (Tr. 20, 54). During this same period of 
time plaintiff had his first survey made, which showed 
the fen~e south of the true boundary (Tr. 20-21). There-
after, the fence erected by plaintiff was removed, plain-
tiff and defendant had discussions as to location of the 
boundary, and the matter culminated in the filing of 
this suit May 14, 1957 (Tr. 21, 22, 58). 
Trial was had without a jury before th!e Hon. John 
F. Wahlquist on October 15, 1959, and the court resolved 
the issues in favor of defendant and against plaintiff 
and entered judgment thereon October 28, 1959. From 
this judgment plaintiff takes this appeal. 
III. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. The evidence does not support the findings of 
fact or the judgment. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
This proceeding is an equitable one, and this court 
should review both the law and the facts as reflected 
in the record. Tripp v. Bagley. 74 Wash. 57, 276 Pac. 
913. 
Unless a boundary by acquiescence was established 
subsequent to plaintiff's purchase of these properties 
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in 1951, each section of plaintiff's property must be 
considered individually in attempting to evaluate the 
evidence supporting the fenceline. It is thus important 
to weigh the evidence of acquiescence since 1951. 
It is without dispute that the fence has there ex-
isted, and that defendant occupied her premises up to 
the fence line during this period. It would also seem 
that prior to the survey (circa 1954), plaintiff acqui-
esced in the line indicated by the fence; however, upon 
learning of the true location of the boundary, plaintiff 
could and did no longer acquiesce in the fence line to 
establish the boundary. Factually he did not acquiesce 
because the evidence shows he took down the fence he 
erected, but beyond this, as a matter of law he could 
not acquiesce. See 3 Utah Law Review, Boundary by 
.ArCJniescence, at Page 510, where the author states: 
"It is clear that actual knowledge of the true 
boundary prevents uncertainty", 
citing Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 913, 
wherein this court stated at Page 70: 
"We further remark that, if adjoining land own-
ers acquiesce in a division line other than the 
true line, with knowledge of the location of the 
true line and with design and purpose of thereby 
transferring a tract of land from one to the other, 
such acquiescence alone will not operate as a 
conveyance. Land cannot be conveyed fron1 one 
person to another by merely a change in possess-
ion, even though such change in possession con-
tinues for a long period of time." 
If any acquiescence can be claimed against plain-
tiff, therefore, it is only from the time he purchas'ed, 
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1951, to the time of this knowledge (circa 1954), and 
falls far short of the period of acquiescence required. 
Thus in order to establish acquiescence, it will be neces-
sary to go back prior to plaintiff's ownership and since 
the property was then in two separate tracts, each must 
be considered separately. 
First, the Hunter tract, which adjoins defendant's 
property for 49.5 feet. The uncontradicted evidence 
shows that from November 1937 to the present a fence 
existed dividing the two properties; that the fence 
started on the east point of the common boundary and 
ran westerly with a southern bias into the Hunter tract. 
No evidence was offered concerning the origin of this 
fence, and up until plaintiff's purchase in 1951, the 
property was vacant and unoccupied. While the point 
has never been rul'ed on directly, we think that under 
Utah law no boundary by acquiescence can be established 
during a period of time when the other property is 
vacant and occupied. The recent cas'e of Ekberg v. Bates 
121 Utah 123, 239 Pac. 2nd 205, lays down the found-
ation of the doctrine as follows: 
"In Brown v. Milliner 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2nd 202, 
207, which is the latest exp:;_·ession of this court 
in a case involving a boundary line dispute, many 
of the cases decided by this coul·t on that question 
are reviewed and we reaffinn the doctrine that 
the owners of adjoining tracts whose true bound-
ary lines are unknown, in dispute or uncertain 
may by parol agreement ·establish boundarY lines 
which are binding on themselves and their snc-
cessors in interest but concluded that it did not 
apply to the facts in that case. We also said 
tlterein '* * * that in the absence of eYidence that 
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the owners of adjoining property or their pre-
decessors in interest ever expressly agreed as to 
the location of the boundary between them, if they 
have occupied their respective premises up to an 
open boundary line visibly marked by monuments, 
fences or buildings for a long period of time and 
mutually recognized it as the dividing line be-
tween them, the law will imply an agreement fix-
ing the boundary as located, if it can do so con-
sistently with the facts appearing, and will not 
permit the parties nor their grant~ees to depart 
from such line, * * * ''. (Italics added) 
This statement of the law is quoted in 3 Utah Law 
Review, Boundary by Acquiescence at Page 505, and 
the author lists as one of the four el'ements of the 
doctrine "Occupation up to a visible line marked defi-
nitely by monuments, fences or buildings." (Italics ad-
ded) 
The case of Hummell vs. Young, 1 Utah 2nd 237, 
265 Pac. 2nd 410, is perhaps most clearly in point on 
the question of occupation up to the fence line. In that 
case the fence was erected by a party when the land on 
the other side was unoccupied, and was done without 
consultation with the other owner. The possibility of an 
express agreement as to fence location was thus ex-
cluded; and further, this evidence left no room to imply 
such an agreement. 
The Court said that the case was similar to H ante 
Owners Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 
P. 2d 160, in which case the fence was ;erected at a time 
when a common owner had the land on both sides of 
the fence, thus leaving no room for the implication of an 
agreen1ent fixing the boundary. We submit the evidence 
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regarding the Hunter tract falls directly under the 
holding of the Hummel case, since the fence relied on 
was erected and the claimed acquiescence occurred while 
the Hunter tract was vacant and unoccupied. 
The evidence is substantially different on the Weller 
tract. This tract was occupied from the time defendant 
originally purchased until the time suit was filed. The 
time requirement of the doctrine would seem to he satis-
fied. However, there are several other facts here which 
seem sufficient to resist application of the doctrine. 
First is the point that since defendant in 1946 knew 
the fence was off line on the Hunter boundary, she also 
krrew it was off on the Weller property and therefore 
there could be no acquiescence after that time, for reas-
ons previously submitted, namely, that knowledge of the 
true line precludes uncertainty, and uncertainty is es-
sential to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. 
Secondly, plaintiff earnestly contends that the fence 
in existenc'e between the Weller tract and defendant from 
1937-1951 was not sufficient to constitute "a visible line 
marked definitely by monuments, fences or buildings". 
The Weller lot is 66 feet wide along defendant's land. 
The only time the fence has extended farther west than 
it presently is, was a period of about 1¥2 years immedia-
tely after defendant's purchase of the property. Dur-
ing this 1¥2 year period some of defendant's evidence 
showed the fence to within 12 feet of the sidewalk, but 
defendant herself (Tr. 40, Exs. 2 and 3) and her wit-
nesses (Tr. 33, 79) placed it farther east than that. 
Also it is undisputed that the fence was several feet 
short of the tre'e it presently connects with at the time 
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plaintiff purchased and for some undisclosed time prior 
thereto. 
The sum total is that from 19·39-1954 the farthest 
extension of the fence was to the tree 30 feet short of 
the western boundary. Thus of the 66 feet, 36 feet was 
fenced and 30 feet unfenced at all times, with no visible 
marker dividing th'e property on the unfenced portion. 
A little over one-half of the area was fenced, and this 
was on a bias rather than an east-west line. It is inter-
esting to note that the first solid fence post in the 
ground is located 41.5 f:eet east of the west boundary, 
approxi1nately the location that plaintiff testified the 
fence terminated when he purchased his property. 
(Ex. C.) 
Defendant relies on testimony to the 'effect that 
the extension of the fence line would approximately 
bisect the double driveway at the curb to establish a fence 
line. This driveway is shown in Ex. 3, and there is no 
marking of any kind upon it to indicate where the 
boundary is claimed to be. It is difficult to tell from 
looking at it where the center of the driveway is. We 
submit the testimony shows that as to this westernmost 
area of the adjoining properties, not only was there no 
"visible line definitely marked" but on the contrary 
both neighbors were using it in common for an access 
drive! 
One further point that should be considered is 
this : The western end of the fence was destroyed by de-
fendant's son driving a vehicle in th'e driveway next 
to the house, (Tr. 81). The true boundary is only 7 
ft. 9 inches from the Allen home (Ex. C). The fence 
corresponds with the true boundary on the east and 
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moves into plaintiff's property only as it moves westerly. 
We think this is strong evidence that the fence is 
in its present position not because adjoining landowners 
agreed on the boundary in such position, but because 
a fence along the true boundary would not allow vehicles 
room to use the driveway between the fence and the 
house on the Allen property. It would appear that the 
fence was originally placed on the true line (the fact 
that the east end of the fence is directly on the true 
line would indicate the true boundary was known at the 
time it was erected). We think this is strong evidence 
that the fence was never originally placed there as a 
boundary, but was placed on the true line; that as motor 
vehicles and trucks were used in defendant's driveway 
of n'ecessity the fence was broken down and moved to 
the south in order to permit these vehicles access along 
the driveway. The fence was gradually 'bent' to the 
south and was replaced or rebuilt along the lines of the 
fence as moved. What else accounts for one end being 
right on survey and the other a substantial distance off¥ 
Of course, this argument is to some extent conjecture, 
but we submit it fits the facts in evidence far better 
than the assumption or implication that the adjoining 
land owners ever agreed to its present location as a 
boundary. 
The foundation of the doctrine of Boundary by 
Acquiescence is set out in Glenn vs. Whitney, 116 Utah 
267, 209 Pac. 2d 257, where this court said: 
"The theory under which a boundarv line is es-
tablished by long acquiescence along an existing 
fence line is founded on the doctrine that the 
10 
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parties erect the fence to settle some doubt or 
uncertainty which they may have as to, the lo-
cation of the true boundary, and to compromise 
th'eir differences by agreeing to accept the 
fence line as the limiting line of their respective 
lands. The mere fact that a fence happens to be 
put up and neither party does anything about 
it for a long period of time will not establish it 
as the true boundary." 
Further amplification is found in Brown v. Milliner, 
120 Utah lG, 232 Pac. 2d 202: 
"In Holrnes v. Judge, supra, we declared that the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 'rests upon 
sound public policy, with a view of preventin~ 
strife and litigation concerning boundaries' and 
that 'while the interests of society require that 
title to real estate shall not be transferred from 
the owner for slight cause, or otherwise than by 
law, these same interests dernand that there shall 
be stability in boundaries'. However in that case 
we were careful to mark off the limits of the rule. 
Said the Court: 'We do not wish to be under-
stood as holding that the parties may not clai:rr. 
to the true boundary, where an assumed or agreeo 
boundary is located through mistake or inadver-
tence, or where it is clear that the line as located 
was not intended as a boundary, and where a 
boundary so located has not been acquiesced in 
for a long term of years by the parties in in-
terest.'" 
Boundary by acquiescence is a limited doctrin'e, and 
must not be enlarged beyond its original scope and pur-
pose. Defendant has not met these required standards 
of the doctrine as above 'enumerated, but has at most 
shown nothing more than a unilateral belief in the fence 
11 
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as a boundary. The evidence and the physical facts 
militate against a finding of boundary by acquiescence. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
trial court should be reversed, and remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to enter judgment as prayed 
in plaintiff's complaint. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Howell, Stine and Olmstead and 
Richard W. Campbell, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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